




Genomics and epidemiology of polioviruses: How a virus resists eradication

Epidemiology and Genomic Surveillance

July 2027

Darlan da Silva Candido, PhD, Imperial College London

Aim and learning objectives

Understand basic concepts of phylogenetic analysis of viral outbreaks and its applications to poliovirus epidemiology

Specific learning objectives

At the end of this session, you will be able to:

1. **Describe** the principles of viral phylogenetics and genomic epidemiology.
2. **Explain** how pathogen genome sequences can be used to investigate viral outbreaks, with examples from poliovirus and other viruses.
3. **Interpret** basic phylogenetic trees and identify the epidemiological information they provide.
4. **Apply** fundamental phylogenetic concepts to answer questions about outbreak transmission using real sequence data.
5. **Evaluate** simple phylogenetic outputs in a guided practical exercise and discuss their epidemiological implications.


Outline

This session consists of the following elements

1. The world of genomic epidemiology
2. Refresher on polioviruses
3. Polio example 1: Unravelling routes for international spread
4. Polio example 2: Assessing poliovirus surveillance and response
5. Basic phylogenetic concepts
6. Practical activity


1. The world of genomic epidemiology

Why do we sequence pathogens?






The 2013-2016 West African Ebola virus epidemic




- 1610 genomes (5% of all cases)
- Gravity model dynamics of spread: large and close populations
- Closing of borders was not effective
- Spatially dissociated collection of transmission clusters of varying size, duration and connectivity



The 2016-2017 Yellow fever outbreak in Brazil




The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic



Candido et al, Science, 2020

Faria et al, Science, 2021


What can we learn from sequence data?



2. Refresher on polioviruses

The biology of polioviruses


- Causative agent of poliomyelitis (polio acute flaccid paralysis – AFP) ;
- Fecal-oral transmission;
- VP1 is the main capsid protein (~ 900 nucleotides);
- Evolutionary rate: approximately 1×10^{-2} substitutions/site/year;
- 3 serotypes: WPV1 , WPV2 (eradicated in 2015), and WPV3 (2019);
- Only 2 countries are endemic for WPV1: Pakistan and Afghanistan;
- 99.9% of transmission reduction;
- Vaccines: IPV (Salk) and OPV (Sabin);




OPV (Sabin)
• Attenuated; • Cheaper; • Easier to store, transport and administer; • Prevents transmission; • Genetically unstable;

Vaccine-derived poliovirus 2

- Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC);
- Outbreaks of acute flaccid paralysis caused by oral polio vaccination;
- Over 4400 cases of acute flaccid paralysis between May 2016 and May 2026;
- Over 100 outbreaks in 45 countries worldwide;
- VDPV 2: 6 or more mutations from Sabin 2;
- Sabin-like: up to 5 mutations from Sabin 2;




Global burden of VDPV 2



3. Polio example 1: Unravelling routes for international spread

Candido et al, Nat Microbiol, 2025

- No reversed directionality of movement;



4. Polio example 2: Assessing poliovirus surveillance and response

Chopra et al, under review



Kieran Chopra, MRes
PhD candidate
Imperial College London

RDC-MAN-3 outbreak in the DRC

Between 2017 and early 2024, 757 confirmed VDPV2 cases were reported in the DRC



349 of which were from the RDC-MAN-3 outbreak

10 provinces with RDC-MAN-3 poliomyelitis cases spanning eastern DRC

130 sequences from RDC-MAN-3 (33%) polio outbreak in DRC


Sequences generated by Direct Detection Nanopore Sequencing (DDNS)

a Time Series and Map of Confirmed VDPV2-Associated AFP Cases by Emergence Group
Date of Onset of AFP between 2017 and 2023




Unveiling routes for spread

- Undetected transmission by about 1 year;
- Majority of transmission is local (within ADM1)
- 19.9 (69.5%) jumps between neighbours vs 8.74 (30.51%) between non-neighbours
- Outbreak likely spread to Haut Lomami before Haut Lomami was vaccinated



Chasing the virus: vaccination response

- All first importations into new provinces happened before vaccination responses in that area started
- The median delay between introduction and response per province is of at least 5 months but can be as high as 1 year;




5. Basic phylogenetic concepts

What is our objective? What are we trying to answer?


- Identify pathogen
- Understand pathogen diversity
- Outbreak origins
- Number of introductions
- Time importation events
- Estimate growth rate




Analysis pipeline




Phylogenetic tree






Tree topology




Tree topology




Branch lengths





Resolution of phylogenetic relationships




Polytomies: SARS-CoV-2




Rooted vs unrooted tree




Rooting methods








Why is rooting important?




Number of branches:
 $2n-3$



What else can tree structure tell us?

Idealized Phylogeny Shapes	Continual Immune Selection	Weak or Absent Immune Selection	
		Tree shape controlled by non-selective population dynamic processes	
		Population size dynamics	Spatial dynamics
 Time →		Exponential growth 	Strong spatial structure 
		Constant size 	Weak spatial structure 
Examples	Human influenza A virus intra-host HIV	inter-host HIV inter-host HCV	Measles, rabies inter-host HIV
Tree Inferences	Detection of antigenic escape mutations	Estimation of population growth rates	Estimation of population migration rates



Strong immune selection?

